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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-1266
KATHY A. SMITH
               
   v.
THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Kathy Smith,
                Appellant
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Dist. Court No. 02–cv-00021E)
District Court Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 23, 2003
Before: ALITO, FUENTES, and BECKER Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: November 7, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT
2PER CURIAM:
As we write for the parties only, we do not set out the background of this
case.  We find that none of Smith’s grounds for appeal have merit and so we affirm the
order and opinion of the District Court.
Smith first claims that her counsel’s silence at the administrative hearing
rendered her a de facto pro se applicant, triggering a heightened responsibility for the
ALJ to fully and fairly develop the record.  Smith claims the ALJ failed to fulfill this
duty.  “ALJs have a duty to develop a full and fair record in social security cases. 
Accordingly, an ALJ must secure relevant information regarding a claimant’s entitlement
to social security benefits.”  Ventura v. Shalala,  55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995)(citations
omitted).  We find that the ALJ developed a full and fair record in this case.  Contrary to
Smith’s claim that the record was sparse, the ALJ had in front of him the notes of two
treating physicians, an evaluation by an ALJ appointed physician, and the opinion of two
state agency physicians, all of whom examined Smith as to her alleged problems.  The
ALJ also had objective evidence in the form of radiographs and spirometry studies and
subjective evidence from Smith’s forms and testimony.  The ALJ was not required to ask
minute details about Smith’s mental health and daily routines in order to establish a full
and fair record.  The evidence before the ALJ was thorough enough to make the
determination.
3Smith next claims that the ALJ should not have discounted her testimony
without further developing the record.  As stated above, though, the record was full and
fair.  In addition to the forms she filled out, Smith’s testimony runs about eight pages in
the record.  Furthermore, most of the evidence that Smith claims is lacking in her
testimony appears in the record in other forms.
An ALJ’s determination of credibility is afforded “strong deference.”  See
N.L.R.B. v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 518 (3d Cir. 1981). Here the ALJ’s
reason for discounting Smith’s subjective statements was reasonable, specific, and based
on the evidence.  The ALJ found that:
[w]hen considering the record in its entirety, the
claimant’s residual functional capacity is not as
limited as the claimant alleges.  She describes
her pain as “very sharp” and “constant,” but the
objective medical evidence does not support the
severity of the claimant’s alleged pain.  Insofar
as the claimant’s statements are inconsistent
with the residual functional capacity found
herein, her testimony is not wholly credible.
App. at 61.  As such, Smith’s second argument has no merit.
Smith next argues that the ALJ’s determination was against the weight of
the evidence.  An ALJ’s determination must be upheld if it is supported by substantial
evidence.  See 42 U.S.C. 405(g).  Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Richardson v.
Perales,  402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).  Here, the ALJ relied on the opinions of no fewer than
4five doctors in deciding that Smith was not entitled to benefits.  None of the reports
showed evidence of a disability that would prevent Smith from working at the various
jobs the ALJ identified for her.  Some exams even found that the alleged source of her
pain was “normal,” “mild,” and “unremarkable.”  Indeed, the only thing the medical
records reveal is that Smith constantly complained of pain and that, when and if the
doctors did find problems, the problems were unremarkable and did not correspond to the
level of her complaints.
Smith’s final ground for appeal is that the District Court erred by not remanding to
the ALJ in light of new evidence.  This argument is also without merit.  Evidence that is
not in front of the ALJ cannot be used to argue that the ALJ’s decision was erroneous. 
See Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1991).  Nevertheless, when there is
evidence that is “new and material and ... there [is] good cause why it was not previously
presented to the ALJ,” the District Court may remand to the Commissioner for
reconsideration in light of the new evidence.  Matthew v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d
Cir.)(citations omitted).  “Good cause” requires the applicant to articulate a justification
for having failed to present the evidence to the ALJ.  See Szubak v. Sec. of Health and
Human Serv., 745 F.2d 831, 833-834 (3d Cir. 1984).
Smith presented the District Court with medical documents that she obtained after
the administrative hearing.  The District Court found that the all the documents were
“new” and some were “material,” but there was no “good cause” as to why any of them
5could not have been prepared and submitted to the ALJ.  See App. 1(r)-1(s).  The District
Court’s reasoning is persuasive:
[R]emand ... is inappropriate because Smith has not demonstrated good
cause for her failure to present this evidence to the ALJ.  For example, the
aortogram and arterial studies performed on January 11, 2000 were
recommended by Smith’s treating physician ...  as early as ... one month
prior to the July 13, 1999 administrative hearing.  Smith provides no
explanation as to why this test could not have been conducted, and the
results obtained, in time for the ALJ to consider them.  In fact, because the
need for the test was known to Smith well in advance of the administrative
hearing, Smith could have specifically requested that the record remain
open long enough for her to obtain the test results, even if they were not
available as of the date of the hearing.
App. 1(s).  The District Court’s analysis of the lack of good cause for the other documents
in similarly persuasive.  Smith has never offered any reason why the documents were not
presented at the ALJ hearing.  As such, we cannot remand.  See Szubak v. Sec. of Health
and Human Serv., 745 F.2d 831, 833-834 (3d Cir. 1984).

